1
OF KNOWLEDGE
SUMMARY
This first Treatise points out that a consequence of an acceptance of the First
Axiom of the Society is to remove all and any final or ultimate certainty from
our knowledge and beliefs. The Society therefore accepts that all the things
we think we know, and all our beliefs not matter how strongly held, are
disputable and open to doubt. The Treatise goes on to show that uncertainty
has many positive consequences, helping us to live good, peaceful and useful
lives, as well as to achieve the Aim of the Society.
The First Axiom has profound and far-reaching implications. The most
significant and troublesome is that its chance explanation for the existence of
humanity means that we can no longer be certain of any our knowledge, or sure
of the skills and abilities based upon it. The problem is
that if our species exists only by chance, then we cannot avoid the possibility
that our characteristics, qualities, abilities and potential are equally the
result of chance. In which case, there is no longer any certainty that our
species possesses all the senses and abilities required for a complete
understanding of ourselves, our universe or any of its processes. Acceptance
of the First Axiom thus leaves us unable finally to establish the true nature
and extent of the connection between our universe and our capacity to
understand it, or to identify any ultimately certain base on which human
knowledge or understanding can be built.
Clearly, accurate, reliable and useful knowledge of our universe and its
processes can be, has been, and will continue to be, developed using the range of
abilities, capacities and potentialities we happen presently to possess or may
acquire in the future. But the First Axiom implies that such knowledge,
however reliable it may seem or prove to be, must always be subject to the
caveat that it may be subject to the effects or influence of factors,
circumstances or conditions of which, due to our unknowable limitations, we
are, and always will be, unaware.
Previous accounts of the origins of humanity tended to avoid this difficulty.
They commonly did so by seeing our existence as part of an overall order of the
universe in which our capacities and our environment had a common origin, or
were parts of the same whole. Those earlier ideas were therefore able to
assume that our attributes are sufficient to develop whatever quality or
quantity of knowledge of ourselves, our universe and its processes we might
want or need. No such comfortable confidence is available to the Society of
HumanKind.
Furthermore, the Society must acknowledge that the First Axiom leaves no ground
on which we can rest any assumption that the mental processes we presently use
to explain ourselves and our world have any ultimately reliable connection with
the nature or structure of our environment or its processes. What we call
'logic', or 'reason', or even 'intelligence' or 'intuition', may be
characteristics peculiar to our species not necessarily shared by every, or
indeed any, aspect of our universe. Followers of the Society must thus accept
that everything and anything in our universe, including ourselves, may be
governed or shaped by forces, processes, factors and influences to which we do
not have, and will never obtain, any access.
The Society will never even be able to say when, or if, we reach the limit of
our capacity to know or understand. Although we may be able to detect the
outer edge of some aspect of our present skills and knowledge, in the epoch of
the First Axiom we will have no means to establish whether that represents the
absolute limit of the potential of one or other of our attributes, or merely a
stage in their development. At a stroke therefore, the First Axiom leaves the
Society and its adherents in a permanent and unavoidable condition of unending
uncertainty.
This conclusion can give rise to overwhelming anxieties and perplexities. By
removing any ultimately reliable basis for human knowledge, we appear to leave
ourselves adrift in an incomprehensible universe at the mercy of forces and
influences that we may never even detect, let alone learn to grasp or control.
Acceptance of the First Axiom can thus seem to leave us with no hope for the
future. How can we be sure of anything if we cannot trust our senses or our
reasoning? Why should we try to improve or increase our knowledge if, in the
end, we can never be sure of any of it, or the ground on which it is built?
So terrifying is this possibility, so destructive does it seem to be of the
very foundations of our lives, that it is sufficient in itself to account for
the defences of a belief in predestination, or faith in an external all-knowing
omnipotent power or divinity, to be found in many of the ideologies and
philosophies preceding the emergence of the Society of HumanKind. It may also
explain the complex dogmas, mystic metaphors and impenetrable sophistry
developed by many of those earlier systems of thought and belief. In the
light of the Axioms all those devices appear as little more than an attempt to
introduce a comforting hope of final certainty into the complexities and
insecurities of human life.
Indeed, it is a recognition and acceptance of our fundamental uncertainty, of
there being no ultimately indisputable base for any of our beliefs or our
knowledge that chiefly distinguishes the Society of HumanKind from its
precursors. If, however, we can steel ourselves to admit and embrace that
consequence of the First Axiom and plunge whole-heartedly into uncertainty
we can then begin to find a new and surer place and purpose for ourselves
in the universe, and give ourselves hope for an infinite future.
That hope grows from an observation made earlier in this Treatise. Prior to
the emergence of the Society, humanity has been in the habit of accepting,
consciously or unconsciously, that there are some aspects of our lives and our
universe that are destined always to be beyond our comprehension or control.
Many examples of that self-imposed limitation are available, one being the
tacit assumption that any attempt to use our existing attributes and abilities
to account for their own origins must lead to an infinite regress, and
therefore always be inconclusive. Another is the often argued proposition
that we can never expect fully to divine the meaning of our lives since to do
so would require us to possess all the powers and attributes of whatever we
might regard as our originator or creator. No such limits exist in the era of
the Society of HumanKind. With the Axioms as our starting point we may lose
the illusion of certainty but we gain the liberating insight that no humanly
conceivable area of interest or enquiry is closed to us.
So the first hopeful conclusion that can be drawn from the seemingly devastating
effects of the First Axiom is that its destruction of the former basis for our
knowledge also frees us from our earlier reliance on some external source for
ourselves and our potentialities. Once that momentous step is taken, the
Second and Third Axioms then enable us to recognise that our uncertainty must
extend both to our future as a species, and to the potential of our attributes
and qualities. In short, a beginning from the First Axiom leads us at first
to the conclusion that neither our future nor that of our universe is in any
way settled or determined, but then to a novel standpoint from which we gain an
entirely new and hopeful perspective on ourselves and on our possibilities.
In a universe of total uncertainty created by the First Axiom we can never know
how far; in what direction; or to what extent, human abilities and knowledge,
or the skills that grow from them, might develop, nor can we anticipate the
future form or capacity of human individuals or of the society they create.
Equally, we can ever know when we have reached the limit of any aspect of our
skills or abilities. Once we accept that as our reality, then the Second and
Third Axioms allow us to conclude that at any and every moment in time we have
every right, and indeed no alternative other than, to regard the potential of
the skills, capacities and knowledge of our species as limitless.
Thus, in our absolute uncertainty we will always be entitled to assume that any
unsolved problem we face, or any limit on our capacities we presently
experience, will be removed at some point in our future by some as yet
unforeseeable change in our environment or development in our skills or
knowledge. And it should be noted that an infinite increase in the quantity
of our abilities and knowledge is sufficient for this purpose. No qualitative
change in either ourselves or our capacity to use our knowledge and skills is
either necessary or implied.
But how does this new view of ourselves and our potentialities reflect on the
question that must be of the greatest interest the Society and its adherents;
that is, whether or not humanity has the potential to achieve the Objective of
the Dogma and the Aim of the Society of HumanKind? What is required for those
purposes is the discovery of a means to grant an eternal existence to all
humankind under conditions that will allow us to extend that new freedom from
death to all our predecessors and successors. These are powers and abilities
we have never possessed, and ones clearly beyond our present grasp. If the
uncertainty created by the First Axiom is all-pervading it must also apply to
prospects of the Society for the achievement of its Aim.
The difficulty for the Society is that while the arguments so far deployed in
this Treatise give rise to some hope for the achievement of its Aim, those same
arguments will support diametrically opposite conclusions. On one hand the
uncertainty created by the First Axiom can lead us to believe that the
unprecedented abilities required for the fulfilment of its Aim must be within
the reach of our potential. On the other, we can conclude that they will be
forever beyond our grasp. Faced with that ambivalent implication of its own
Axiomatic base the Society cannot rely solely on the possibility of an infinite
expansion of our abilities, skills and knowledge to justify its commitment to
the achievement of the Objective of the Dogma and the subsequent realisation
of its Aim. Its hopes for the salvation of humanity need a wider base.
Thankfully, that greater security for the Society is available and can be found
in a full understanding of the concept that summarises all three Axioms, and
which forms the heading to that part of this book; that we are alone in the
universe. To be thus utterly alone, as the First and Third Axioms imply,
means that there is no power or entity to which we are subject. We owe our
existence, our attributes and potential, and our continued survival, to no-one
and to no-body. With no master to serve or please, and no omnipotent power in
our universe with any interest in or concern with us, or having any degree of
control or direction over our lives, we are, for the first time in our history,
totally free to set ourselves any objective, and to search for knowledge in any
direction and on any subject we may conceive and choose.
And while, at first glance, the implication of the Second Axiom; that the
range and extent of our future knowledge, characteristics and capacities cannot
be defined or predicted, sets a limit on what we might hope to achieve as a
species, that otherwise negative proposition rests on an undeniable premise.
It is that the human species does indeed possess characteristics and
potentialities, albeit they may in time vary and change. And, on the evidence
of this book itself, among those potentialities are both the power to imagine,
and the freedom to choose, meaning and purpose for ourselves and our species.
When the Society of HumanKind imagines an objective for our future that gives
meaning to our existence, and then chooses to pursue it, that can only be an
exercise of human attributes and an expression of their potential. Indeed any
such series of decisions can only emerge from, and must be an integral part or
an expression of, humankind.
The First Axiom may destroy the possibility of there being any ultimately certain base
for our knowledge, and provide no guarantee that we will ever develop the capacity
to grasp, let alone entirely resolve, all the mysteries of our universe. But a
fuller understanding of the Axioms taken as a whole leads to an apocalyptic insight.
We may never be certain of success in what we attempt, and cannot expect to grasp
what is beyond our potential to understand. We can therefore never seek what
we cannot imagine. But the manifest potential of our species includes a capacity
to conceive a meaning and purpose for our lives, coupled with an ability to
choose between various objectives for the future of our species. Any full
grasp of the concept that we are alone in the universe will thus reveal what
philosophy has long known; that nothing we can imagine can ever be absolutely impossible.
Our potential is limited only by the range of our imagination, and since we can
conceive of having an eternal existence beyond death, we are free to choose it as
the purpose of our lives.
We can make that choice with the confidence described in this Treatise and
summarised in the Dogma of the Society. All that is required is that we
should choose to come together in a co-operative effort to expand
and share our skills and knowledge, and then never abandon our search for
salvation. The Society of HumanKind is the means to those ends, and these
founding books of the Society are an example, as well as a demonstration,
of what can emerge from that faith in ourselves and each other.
The freedom to determine our own future gained by an acceptance of the Axioms
comes from their rejection of any dependance on an external source for the
human species and its potentialities. That seeming negative assertion about
the origins and nature of human existence enables us to see, perhaps for the
first time, that our imagination is as much part of us as any of our other
attributes and characteristics. Any aspiration we have, including any hope
for salvation and a life beyond death, can confidently and properly be
recognised as no more nor any less than an expression and measure of the
potential of our qualities and capacities.
This Treatise begins with an acceptance that the Axioms destroy any ground for
a belief that there must be a unity between the universe and our species.
That was the base on which much earlier understanding of the future of
humankind and of its abilities, skills and knowledge was built. In its place
however, the Society of HumanKind offers a unity of humanity, and within each
individual, on which we may securely build our hopes, not simply for the
achievement of the Objective of the Dogma and the Aim of the Society, but for
human possession of powers of perception, creation and transformation hitherto
reserved to the gods and demons of our childhood dreams.
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